Any politician or Minister for Internal Mfairs, adopting a generous and leftist stance on these questions, might weH explain to us that immigration and hospitality cannot be considered as homogenous ur identical phenomena. Hospitality refers us back to major canonical texts. Immigration refers us to the potential adaptation of (potential) citizens to a given state of French society. Hospitality, in an ethical register, might consist in welcoming the other within the private sphere, or offering shelter in the u 1 aditional Creek sense. Meanwhile foreign citizens or those without legal residency status (sans papiers) who arrive here en masse, and who must fit into our society, would be related to an entirely different kind ofproblem: an economic and social problem. (1999a, 99) What might Derrida have to say to a minister of immigration? To pllrsue this questioll, 011e must first C011sider the distinctions he l~enelope Deutscher draws betweell the ideas of conditional alld U11COllditional hospitality and between formal and ethical hospitality.
To begin with the first term-col1ditiollal hospitality-there is hardly a shortage of instances within the ca110nical tradition. In an ancient Creek COIltext, a formal right to hospitality was extended to someone from allother city, Ilamely the stranger or xenos, who was accustomed to a different set of laws. Yet the straIlger was C011Sid-ered to some extent as the "like." For example, the right to hospitality was extellded only to those with a family llame. The rights and duties associated with the stranger's right to hospitality were also extended to the lineage of descendal1ts beariI1g that family 11ame. The logic of hospitality therefore assumed that the stranger belonged to a family structure not unlike that of the AtheIlian family structure, aIld it also assumed that the stranger was rational and responsible, and therefore recognizing laws, rights, aIld duties similarly to the Athenian (Derrida 2000, 21-23) . That this hospitality was C011di-tional ca11 be seen in the fact that it was not offered to "an anonymous new arrival and someone who has neither name, nor patronym, nor family, nor social status, a11d who is therefore treated 110t as the foreigller, but as another barbarian" (2000, 25) .
Other traditioIlS of COllditional hospitality which Derrida investigates include all ancieIlt Islamic traditioll of Ilomadic communities who offered ullliInited hospitality to lost travelers, but only for three days, after which departllre from the community was obligatory (1999a, 105). Kant's "COllditions of Perpetual Peace" (1983) introduces the concept of a universal hospitality. Every state should offer hospitality to every visitor, but again, this universalllospitality was conditional: visitors should conduct themselves peacefully and appropriately, and will remaill visitors to, rather than residellts of the state (Derrida 1999a, 105) . Finally, iIl Adieu (1999b), Derrida considers hospitality as a term which appears illtermittently throughout Levinas's Totality and Infinity, which he interprets in the COlltext Levinas's later writings which deal with justice, the state, and the 11ation (1999b, 73) .
In Adieu, Derrida defines political crimes of deportation and incarceration as crimes agaiIlst hospitality (71). The precedent is given by the COlltroversial "Debre" laws upheld duriIlg arecent period in French politics, in which it was deemed a "delit d'hospitalite illegale" to protect illegal residents from expulsion, for example by conceal-iIIg or sheltering them in one's horne. The fact that "ill the spirit of the decrees and ordiIlallces of 1938 alld 1945" such protection is deemed by French authorities a "delit d'hospitalite," leads Derrida to call that law a more general kind of crime "agaiIlst hospitality endllred by the guests [hotes] and hostages of our time, day after day incarcerated or deported, from concentration camp to detention camp, from border to border, nearby or far away " (1999b, 71) .
I would like to consider his commellts on political policies concerlIillg immigration. In the above passage from Manifeste pour l'hospitalite, Derrida acknowledges the charge of irrelevance that a millister of immigratioll might direct towards philosophical reflectiollS on concepts of hospitality. Concerllillg the meanillg of hospitality, he llotes that "the use of this word immediately raises the question of whether it can be translated by other words, such as immigration or the illtegration of foreigilers. Are these homogenous concepts? Is it a matter of the same thitlg?" (Derrida 1999a, 99) . He recogllizes that one might have reservations about translating "an ethics of hospitality illtO the political or economic order" (1999a, 98-99) . But he has frequently evoked the possibility of the inseparability of these orders in discussing the contemporary political situation and attitudes towards immigratioll in Frallce. His interest has beeIl directed, for example, toward the close connectioll of apparellt institutiollal generosity and its extreme opposite: "when those hosts who are apparently, alld present thelnselves as being, the Inost ge11erous, COllstitute themselves as the most limiting (for illstance, Michel Rocard statillg that France can't offer ahorne to everybody in the world who suffers [la Fral1ce ne pouvait accueillir toute la misere du monde]) " (1999a, 116) .
Withill the field of conditional hospitality, there are, on the one hand, gestures identifiable as literal hospitality such as an invitatiOll to someOlle considered as a guest by someone COllsidered a host. On the otller halId, there are state alld political party based policies on national immigration. Many would consider that these are vastly differellt domains, not appropriately considered in the same terms. It might be considered that hospitality is a private and domestic matter, far from tlle COllcern of public or natiollal immigration policy. Whatever duties, rights, or politics are involved in the latter, it would be peculiar to formulate them itl what is typically the private lallguage of hospitality. However, Derrida has proposed that we think of these domaills in connection with each other, and in cOllnectioll with the problematic of a pure and impossible hospitality.
When Derrida deerns incarceratioll or deportation a crime against hospitality, he does so in terms of an ethic of hospitality we might imagirle as all ideal. This is very simply defined in terms of the "better. " For example, respollsibility is defined in terms of ensuriIlg that hospitality, while conditional, be "the best possible. Hence responsibility COl1Sists in attributing to that hospitality which we wallt to be as large as possible, the best conditionality, the best possible law" (1999a, 101).
Derrida appeals to all ethics that exceeds existing legal elltitlements iIl relation to the right to citizenship, residency, or free movement. While the Frel1ch government may have the legal right to expel illegal immigrants, Olle may llonetheless deern the policy a crime against hospitality, if it is thought of as all ideal for the best possible practice. This ethics must be distiIlguished from political rhetoric in which Olle speaks in the name of hospitality so as to lay claim to national or property boundaries. When the cOIlservative Australian governmel1t temporarily admitted Kosovar refugees in 1999, the gesture was presellted within discourse of hospitality. In the words of Prime Minister JOhl1 Howard "they were invited here and Australia respollded far more generously thal1 most other countries" (Howard 2000) . He made clear that the refugees had no right to residency in Australia. The cOl1cessional lal1guage ill which Australia's hospitality was extel1ded emphasized this POillt, as did the fact that refugees were confilled to a remote, former army barracks, and subject to expulsio11 at the caprice of the Australian government.
The extension of 110spitality by Australia in this form is the context for what Derrida might define as a crime against hospitality. While Derrida's invocation of an ethics of hospitality is not reducible to his readillg of Levillas, it is useful to consider the distillction discussed in that readillg. The hospitality evoked by Levinas, Derrida points out, precedes property (1999b, 45) . By contrast, the hospitality offered by the Australiall governmellt (and most commollly offered, both personally and politically) occurs ill the name of property. Extending hospitality to Kosovars was one of the many mea11S by which the Australian gover11ment asserts property rights over the territory to which they provisionally offered them residellcy, and it would make no sense ill the absellce of that assertion of property rights. If we define this as formal hospitality it call be terminologically distinguished from "ethical" hospitality. Olle means of distinguishing these might be that the former presupposes the assertion of property whereas the latter precedes such assertions.
The literal offering of formal hospitality often-alld perhaps structurally-presupposes that the host who offers it has a proper domain or dwelling. It supposes, consolidates, or iIlstitutes the host's proper place (house, horne, nation, land, domaiIl, camp, restiIlg place) alld also presupposes the host's rights over that proper place, either in terms of ownership, custoclianship, or at least authority over that place. A gesture of literal or forrnal hospitality aSSUlnes someoIle's right to say to another that s/he may or may not occupy one's own natioll, lalld, or place of dwelliIlg. It assurnes a certain relationship to authority, laws, and permission, in the occupation of the role of the gatekeeper who says, "you may pass." This is one reason why one might say that literal or formal hospitality is inherently illhospitable. As Derrida has elsewhere writtell of the gift, once a gesture is recogllized as hospitality, it assurnes that the person who grallts it might have refused it. If that's not so, it is not literal hospitality. If it is recognized as hospitable, it assurnes that we (guest and host) have followed preexisting formulae recognizable as those of hospitality. But true hospitality, suggests Derrida, would not be robotic, tlle mere following of formulae. It would involve the very reinvention of hospitality, which (in its most radical expressioll) would be unrecognizable as such. It would require the iIlventioll not only of its OWll forms, rules, or conditiollS, but also of its own language. ConcerniIlg the inventioll of its own langllage, pllre hospitality would be poetic. The momellt it is recognizable as such (accordiIlg to preexisting forms and discourse), it is no 1011ger what Derrida suggests as a radical hospitality (1999a, 134) .
Less radically, the position assumed by the apparelltly hospitable person (adjudication, granting passage, assertioll of the authority to grant or deny access) is iIlherently inhospitable. The gesture ofliteral or formal hospitality always says, iIl essellce: I let you in, but in doing so lassume the right to determine your Inovements, I say that I Inight not have let you in, and I Inight later iI1Sist Oll your departure.
In additioll to property, oWllership, authority, gatekeeping, C011-trol, order, and regulatiol1, the conditiollS of what I am distinguishing as literal or forlnal hospitality from ethical hospitality have often beeIl a body of patriarchal customs. For example, the right to AtheniaIl hospitality is exteIlded to the stra11ger al1d his family, while women are subsumed uIlder the latter. As Derrida asks of this COl1text: "Qui serait Ulle etrallgere?" (1997b, 67) ("What would a foreigll woman be? " Derrida 2000, 73) . As he notes, it has usually beeIl the father and the husbal1d who lays dOWl1 the laws of hospitali ty (2000, 149) . He discusses the JudeoChristian traditioll of hospitality seen in various biblical stories that highlight the frequelltly sacrificial role ofwomen il1 the economy of hospitality offered to the stranger. Loth's daughters are, for example, sacrificed ill Loth's fidelity to the law of hospitality. Mter Loth takes in strangers, the men of Sodom arrive, demal1ding access to the men he is sheltering. Protecting his guests, Loth volunteers il1 their stead his two virgin daughters with whom, he offers, the Sodomites can do as they please (2000, .111 this story, women pay the price for and erlable the means of Loth's hospitality towards his fellow man, and this is also more banally true i11S0-far as it is often the wome11 who tend to the straIlger to whom the patriarch has offered shelter.
There is an often-concealed backdrop, thell, to the economy of generosity, and welcome of the foreigll which takes place between men. The stranger must be idelltified to some extent as "like" the host, not as the radically unknowable stranger. Thillk of Derrida's reminder that the stral1ger-guest, the xenos, elltitled to AtheIlia11 hospitality was not "the other, the completely other (le tout autre) who is relegated to an absolute outside, savage, barbaric, precultural, arld prejuridical, outside and prior to the family, the cOlnmullity, the city, the 11atioll, or the State" (2000, 73) . It is 110t typically offered to, or by a woman, except insofar as the woman belongs to the family of the straI1ger or host, although women are ofteil the routes by which it is possible to offer hospitality. fuld it occurs through an admissioll of the heterogeneous or strange, which could be said to simultaneously undermine that admissiol1 by settiIlg COllditions to it. In other words, iI1 extendirlg hospitality to the llnkl10w11 stral1ger who is of another kirld but IlOt tao stral1ge, I shall admit strangeness, but in the mode of doing so I shall admit the like.
Finally, literal hospitality presupposes property or at least the assertion of rights over land or a domain under the jurisdiction of masters authorized to permit the offering of shelter to the straliger. What then is the condition of the domain governed by the patriarch? Often that he has colonized anotller people. For example, hospitality is often offered on the land once appropriated frOln some invaded or enslaved people deemed barbaric.
To offer literal hospitality, you mllst be (or deern YOllrself to be) authorized to act as the gatekeeper of a domain. But what if colonizatiOll grounds the assertion of such authorization? Let's thiIlk then of an Australian prime minister, or a millister of imlnigration, a John Howard or Philip Ruddock, and the condition of their ability, to offer, on behalf of the natioll, temporary hospitality to Kosovars. These conditions depend Oll the previous COlollizatioll by Europeans of Aboriginal peoples and land, to gellerate the possibility of that white, Australiall bellevolence. What if those values specifically associated with hospitality (gelierosity towards the other, fraternity with the other, duty towards the other) must have already brutally failed to generate the possibility ofbenevolent natiollal hospitality? What if colonialism is the condition of hospitality? And how might this possibility be related to Derrida's suggestions in "Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!" that hospitality is culture itself, ethics itself (1997a, 42) and iIl Monolinguism ofthe Otheralld in "Fidelite aplus d'un" that all culture is originally colonial (1996,39; 1998a, 259) ?
The two commellts suggest tllat we need to think culture iIl terms of the illtersection of hospitality and coloniality.
I have so far melltioned contexts discussed by l)errida of conditional hospitality, such as its being offered to all other identified as the stranger, while excluding an other identified as the savage or barbaric. I mentioned that Derrida's question is whether hospitality is possible, and referred to the fornlulation according to which a COllditional hospitality would be iIiherelltly illhospitable. This suggests that only an uncoliditional or pure hospitality would be truly hospitable. But the question Derrida will also ask is whether an Ullconditiollal hospitality itself could ever be possible, and this is the question also posed by hirn ill the context of roundtable discussioilS of immigratioll.
Preoccupied, as we know, by problems ofimpossibility, one ofDerrida's arguments has been that the strallger is impossible, or at least, impossible for us: "To speak of the strallger (l'etranger) is to speak of the possibility of this is the very im-possible" (1998a, 246) . This POitlt ca11 be generalized to discussions of alterity and the other that COllstitute the problem of allticipatioll. At the POillt at which I identify the other as other (as iIl "this is the other," or "this is my other"), I subordiIlate the other to my domaiI1s of anticipation, understallding, alld recogllitioll. The momellt I do that, the other is no longer other, and could never have beeIl the other. My very ability to say to or about the other that this is the other ul1dercuts the possibility that this is the other. At the poit1t Olle ellcounters, or identifies the other, s/he could not have been the other. 111 this sellse, the other could be described as impossible. The advellt of the other would have to break or thwart Iny horizon of expectation alld allticipatioll iIl every sellse (1998a, 246) . Any subordil1atioll of the other to the domain of preexisting sellse (allowing the intelligible identificatioll this is the other) would already have anllulled the impossibility, the foreigIlness, or the alterity I Inight have hoped to greet.
Derrida extends this POiIlt to the problem of hospitality. In Manifeste pour l'hospitalite he asks if an unconditional hospitality is possible:
In an unconditional hospitality, the host should, in principle, receive even before knowing anything about the guest. . . [the host] should avoid every question about the other's identity, desire, rules, capacity for work, integration, adaptation From the Inoment [des lors] that I pose all these questions and conditions ... the ideal situation of non-knowledge is broken. (Derrida 1999a, 98) Let's say that an U11COIlditio11al hospitality would have to be offered to all uillimited number of unknowIl others, to an unlimited extellt, and to whom no questiollS were posed. It fails as such if it is offered only ullder duress, or to fulfill a debt, or out of legal or moral obligation. Again COIlsider for COlltrast that very limited hospitality offered by Australia to Kosovars, COllditional as it was Oll a cOllcept of national duty and professed reluctance to undertake that duty, on the identification of a victim deemed inlloceIlt, and patently conditional also Oll a requiremeIlt of the guest's Sllfficiellt gratitude. To returll to John Howard's commentary:
I would imagine that the great bulk of the refugees are immensely grateful for the safe haven that Australia's provided.... What they do have is an entitlement to stay at our expense in accommodation that we have nominated.... And they have a right to move around, but they don't have the right to say to us: weIl look we don't like that accommodation which the government is providing. (Howard 1999) It seemed that some of the Australian tabloid media feIt the requirement of appropriate gratitude had not been fulfilled when, as was recoullted to readers with considerable outrage, a group of Kosovar mell criticized the quality and COllditions of Australiall hospitality. From the perspective of the hosts, the COl1dition of Australian hospitality to Kosovars seemed to be precisely that the guests undertake no assessment as to its quality 01' adequacy.
But, argues Derrida, hl an Ul1COllditional hospitality, the other whom we welcome "might violate, might be all assassin, might disrllpt my home ... might come to nlake revolution," and I would have to welcome that possibility (1999a, 100). Our welcome would not be contingent on prior interrogations about the other's idelltity, let alone their return of gratitude, leadhlg Derrida to ask, h1 0/Hospitality: Does one give hospitality to a subject? to an identifiable subject? to a subject identifiable by name? to a legal subject? 01' is hospitality rendered, is it given to the other before they are identified, even before theyare (posited as or supposed to be) a subject, legal subject and subject nameable by their family name, etc? (2000, 29)
The moment we assume that the other is all other, all0ther subject like me, 01' another subject not like me, even humall as opposed to nOllhuman, there are prerequisite questions we have already asked and answered. The prerequisite assumption we have made when we greet the other is that we do already know hiln 01' her: he 01' she is fUlldamentally like us and so there is some kind of fraternity between 11S. In so far as that must be so, Derrida argues there could never be an unconditional hospitality. We have always already sllbjected the other to a question we have already answered, at least to some extent.
Among the reasons for this, thirlk again ofhis commeIlt, "From the momeIlt [des lors] that I pose all these qllestions alld ... conditiollS ... the ideal situation ofnon-knowledge is brokell" (1999a, 98). This ideal situation must always already be brokell, if it is 110t possible to turn to 01' think of the other without already having posed some kirld of question: who, what? In that sellse, a more general hospitality would always "anIlul" itself. There's a sense in which, as Derrida writes, "When I see the other appeal', I am already lamenting the other's absence, adieu, adieu, tu m'abandonnes" (Derrida 1998a, 227) .
Why evoke the impossible? Above all, why do so ill the COlltext of a reflection on acts of llatiollal reception, expulsioll, alld immigration? For whom or what might the thinking of this permanent impossibility of allY unconditional hospitality be useful in such contexts? One moment we can be ironic about the very COllditiollal hospitality offered by white Australian lalldowllers to those of other nations in the guise of generosity or benevolellce. The llext moment we seem to have Derrida remiIlding us that however lamentable practices of conditional hospitality might ofteIl be, UIlCOllditiollal national hospitality would be as impossible as is, for many, leaving permanently open one's front door.
Is his iIltention to reassure us about, or make all apology for, conditional hospitality? "You might as weB be as COIlditional as you like, making no efforts, for you could never have acted UIICOllditionaBy, and anyway, hospitality is itnpossible." Clearly 110t, given the emphasis Derrida gives to a politics of improvillg immigratiolllaws and hospitality more gelleraBy, despite (or in the COlltext of) the impossibility of pure hospitality.
So, who is beillg asked to reflect on a poetics of pure hospitality? In answer to this question, let's return to tlle minister of immigratiOll, evoked by Derrida as someOlle who may weIl be expected to protest that immigratioll alld a philosophical or poetic reflection on hospitalityare entirely different spheres.
Could it be that the millister of immigration is already engaged ill a reflection Oll the possibility of pure hospitality? COllsider how those wanting to limit immigration programs ofteIl speak precisely in the name of UIICOllditional hospitality, evoked as a threat: a flood of immigrants might be admitted, those telnporarily admitted might never go horne, they might be assassills, or contribute to violence, terrorism or unrest, or the natioll'S idelltity might simply be lost ill the numbers. So ofteIl we are told that we must draw a limit. Why? While it is constituted as a threat, rather than an affirmative alld general "corne," the meanest acts of limited hospitality live with what they seem precisely to designate as the possibility of ulllimited hospitality. Is this not echoed ill Michel Rocard's comment that France cannot 0pell its doors to all those ill the world who suffer? Apparently, it is Rocard who contemplates an llnconditional hospitality so as to deern it a threat that must be firmly denied.
So we need to ask, not whether the politiciall or others should thiIlk about a poetics of pure hospitality, but how Olle is probably already-alld accordiIlg to Derrida iIlevitably-ellgaged, if implicitly, in such a reflectioll. Such a lurkiIlg poetics can be seen when individual acts of conditional hospitality occur in the COlltext of the belief that one must set limits, or when acts of iInprovement (or deterioration) of immigration laws occur with regrets about the impossibility of all unlimited opelling of natiollal boundaries. This is olle response which could be made by Derrida to the minister of inlmigration who considers problems of hospitality to be far removed from those of political and state policy: to ask how the former is already implicated iIl the latter.
The possibility of ullconditional hospitality is apparelltly believed in, and in conjunction with this, it is feared. Perhaps it is the pOSiIlg of ullconditional hospitality as a natiollal threat that has already failed to recognize that unconditional hospitality is impossible? Yet an emphasis Oll the impossibility of pure hospitality is unlikely to soothe the politician or the xell0phobe who fears it. The politiciall, or the xenophobe, is worried about tlle horde of people who might come. Pure hospitality is impossible iIl the sense that I Ilever could radically take up the position: come.
In De l'hospitaliteDerrida associates xenophobia with the fear that olle's horne will 110 longer be one's own domain, olle's inviolable private space. Furthermore, "one can become virtually xellophobic itl order to protect or claim to protect one's own hospitality, the OWll horne that makes possible one's own hospitality" (2000, 53) . Offering residency to somebody else relies on establishing the lalld as one's OWIl. But this point is elsewhere made as a means of converting the understandiIlg of the visitor as threat into an understanding of the visitor as olle's fortune. What if the land is only my own because I call offer it to somebody else? What if the act of offerillg it performatively insists on the fact that it is mille? But to argue in this context that hospitality is more good fortune than risk can also be considered a decOIlstructioll of one's status as host. Rather tllan the guest being dependent Oll my bellevolence, I am depelldent on the guest to give me the opportunity of taking the position of host (1999a, 118). Certaillly one might pllrsue a critique of llational hospitality in relation to immigration formulated iIl terms which only COllsolidate the assertion of one's rights over the land, particlllarly when those rights are grounded ill literal colonial or appropriative violellce. Alollg these lines Olle might note the cOllnection between hospitality and xenophobia. Olle might explore the possibility of 110tioilS of generosity, hospitality, alld respollsibility that might be less grounded ill demarcations of what is properly mille.
At the outset of this discussion, it seemed that the conditiollS of hospitality would be that I c}loose to offer sOlnethillg I possess (my territory) to an other who does Il0t already ill some way occupy it. If these are the conditiollS, hospitality is also, in a more general sense, impossible. The discrete identity of the welcomillg self is in questioll, mediated as it is by its identificatiolls with, fear of, or distancing from the other. "An identity is 11ever (defillitively) given, received nor attained; Ollly the intermillable alld indefinitely phalltasmatic process of identification endures," writes Derrida in Monolinguism of the OtheT (1998b, 28) . Xellophobia is sometimes interconnected with the failure to come to terms with this: "xenophobic and illhospitable behavior can be analyzed as the behavior of those who have difficulties with the foreigller within olleself, with their OWll phantoms, while those who have the taste, the talent or the genius for hospitality are those who accept multiplicity within themselves, who know how to deal with the stral1ger within, in its multiple forms" (1999a, 139). III Manifesto, he also reminds that "Lallguage is also, in a certaill way, the foreigller withiIl olleself because it's a matter of heritage, composed of things, forces, motivations that I have Il0t chosen alld which constitutes the other, others (1999a, 139). In The OtheT Heading he emphasizes that "what is proper to a clllture is to Il0t be idelltical to itself' (Derrida 1992, 9) . A l1ation-state is llever itself, l1ever a homogeneous, self-identical ullited voice or people. Its territory is llever its own, alld we can think this ill many ways: ill cases of the literal Colollial history of a coulltry such as Australia, and in a killd of gelleralized Colollialism which Derrida has argued, in Monolinguism of the OtheT arId in "Fidelite ä plus d'UII" pertains to all cultures:
A culture forms, stabilizes or forms roots ... through force conflicts, the phenomena of imposition and hegemony, repelling and repressing.... A culture is always the hegemonie and coercive imposition of a group, a force, a drive, a fantasln over another. Coloniality is always at work. (Derrida 1998a, 259) Derrida speaks to a rethinking of the concepts that literal hospitality seems to presuppose, such as one's OWll residence, olle's proper identity, and olle's proper cultural identity. In offering hospitality to Kosovars, the AustraliaIl state presumes alld asserts the integrity of its idelltity and property. But how might the rights and duties of hospitality be rethought once this illtegrity is more properly itl question? Derrida does IlOt offer an argumellt for the elld to all efforts at hospitality, but an argument für the recollception of its terms. For example, he speaks for an ethics of "responding for and to what will never be ... mine " (1998a, 260) , as opposed to a hospitality grouilded itl the assertioll ofwhat is mitle.
The argument is particularly risky. Derrida emphasizes that iIl no way does he wish to mitlimize the importallce oflegal citizenship and other formal rights (1998a, 257). Nevertheless, his argument that noone properly has his or her own identity, property, language and heritage could seem to say to those dispossessed of lallguage, heritage, land, property, citizenship, and vOtitlg entitlements: why IlOt sacrifice these as values to which one aspires. A well-worn critical response to Derrida has been emphasiziIlg the difference between the deconstruction of these aspirations when espoused by the entitled subject associated with them, alld the decollstructioll of these aspirations in relatioll to those deprived ofthem. Nevertheless, mallywho have supported indigellous land rights would be the first to argue that a rethinkillg of the EuropeaIl relatiollship to hospitality, property, heri tage, alld responsibility is critical to an adequate formulatioll of those rights. One of tlle most well-recügllized dilemmas associated with itldigenous lalld rights claims is the recollsolidation of British traditionallegal concepts of property, ownership, and compensatiol1 which has occurred as itldigenous lalld rights claims have been by Ilecessity formulated iIl these terms in order to be legible to Australian courts. Derrida's argument for a general rethinkitlg of the philosophical bases of citizenship, natiollality, aIld hospitality makes sense from this perspective. This would mean notjust that indigenous lalld rights claims need make themselves legihle to British legal traditiollS, hut that European-based understandiIlgs of property, citizenship, responsibility, identity, culture, hospitality, al1d coloniality must also be open to recollceptualization.
To approach this suggestion, I'd like to imagiIle Derrida's declaratioll that "all culture is esselltially colonial" (1998b, 39) directed at a privileged white Australiall perspective, wllose supposition is that, whoever has been colonized, it is certainly not this self, not this Australiall. This Australiall has la11guage, land, and above all, rights, so much so that it is one's right to impose upon somebody else, as when argumellts are put that those who "choose to live in Australia" must be competent in E11glish. How treacherous a11 argllme11t that all culture is colorlial could be, to be sure. Sorneo11e tries to recount the specificity of Australian illdigellous experierlce, only to be greeted with the response: "yes, yes, we kllOW, for we have all been colonized, we are all colonial." Certainly Derrida avows that he wishes llot to suppress differences between the experiences of the literally colonized, alld those who have urldergolle "the coloniality of every culture": I would not like to make too easy use of the word "colonialism." ... The question here is not to efface the arrogant brutality of what is called modern colonial war in the strictest definition.... On the contrary. Certain people, myselfincluded, have experienced colonial cruelty ... but ... it reveals the colonial structure of any culture in an exemplary way. (1998b, 39) Certainly, he acknowledges that he will be seen as suppressing those differences: "I will be accused of confusing it all." And given that this danger is so apparent, and the position he has taken up so precarious, why does he do it?
ThiI1k of the readiness of the person who aggressively believes that their horne is their own, to admit that it rnay rlot be. The white landowller who believes that 011e could lose one's horne to indigenous Australialls through some decision of the Australian courts thereby admits that one does not have a proper, unbreakable tie to one's horne. The larnellt "our hornes are rlot our OWll"-for exarnpie, when said even in the legal naivete of those whose hornes are the product of colonial iI1vasion-describes arId avows a situatioII it wants to fend off. These hornes are not one's own. Property OWllership is founded in laws opell to change aIld by a politics that carl alter it. A goverIlment body ca11 appropriate ahorne under certain circurnstances. National status Wllich assures horne ownership is subject to alteratioll ullder the conditions of anIlexing, invasion, coup d' etat, or revolutioll.
Derrida's readiIIg is directed at the subject he narnes, using an old-fashioIled language-the master arId the question of what that master rightfully owns-whether that be one's proper coulltry, or olle's proper lailguage:
For contrary to what one is most tempted often to believe, the master is nothing. And he does not have exclusive possession of anything. Because the master does not possess exclusively and naturally what he calls his language, because, whatever he wants or does, he cannot maintain any relations of property or identity that are natural, national, congenital or ontological with it, because he can only give substance to and articulate this appropriation in the course of an unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions, because language is not his natural possession, he can, thanks to that very fact, pretend historically, through the rape of a cultural usurpation, which means always essentially colonial, to appropriate it in order to impose it as "his own." That is his belief, he wants to make others share it through the use offorce or cunning. (1998b, 23) Doesn't the language of colonialism consolidate the impression that the dispossessed are dispossessed of something the master does have? 111 fact, doesll't it reinforce the myth in which the master is highly itIvested: that he or she has defillitively, with authority and confidellce: language, culture, ideiltity and/or property?
III other words, COIIsider Derrida's argument as directed at a white, COlollizing perspective which by desigllating the other as disappropriated, ullderstands itself as noncolollized, in possessioll of a proper lallguage, culture, identity and nation, over which it has fU11-dameiltal rights.
In Australia we're so very familiar withJohll Howard's hostile rejection of what he desigllated the black armband approach to history. According to this (itl his imagitlation) he alld today's white Australians would be wrollgfuIly attributed with the shame, guilt, or responsibility that belollgs appropriately Ollly to the original colollizers of Australia, alld earlier goverllments. RejectiIlg a black armballd sentimeilt, Howard strelluously disavows that his own idelltity is that of the colonizer. This identity-and accompanyillg shame aIId responsibility-rightfully belongs only to his allcestors: stIch is Howard's declaratioll. Perhaps Derrida's recellt material on immigratioII and Colollialism acts as a different kiIld of remillder. JOhl1 Howard's disavowal dovetails perfectly weIl with his COllcurrent iIIvestmeIlt in the identity as colonizer. For the Howard-as-colollizer is IIOt the Howard who has been colonized. Howard ellgages in a simultaneously disavowiIlg alld desirous ullderstandillg of indigellous Australians as dispossessed of lallguage, cultural heritage, idelltity, alld land. They do not have these thiIIgS. I, Howard have nothing to do with this. I am not the COlollizer. Yet I, Howard, aln the colonizer for a colonized subject who has lost language, idelltity, lalld. By COlltrast I know that my language is my OWIl, as is my culture a11d my land. Unlike them, I have my heritage, I have my identity.
So long as it is the other who may be seell as dispossessed of language, cultural heritage, idelltity, and land, the subject may all the better retaiIl the myth that he or she is ill full a11d confident possesSiOl1 of these things. What killd of illterventio11 is made illto this myth by Derrida's emphasis of a generalized coloniality? Such an emphasis leads to the affirmatio11 that 110 one properly owns his or her la11d, domaiIl, dwelling, lallguage, and culture. A nation-state is never properly itself. It is never a homoge110us, self-ide11tical united voice or people, whose others remaiIl at the exterior Ulltil offered admission. Language is llever our OWII: it comes to us from the other. Identity is not Ollr OW11, 110r is culture our OWll.
Whell directed at those who have suffered a brutal history of colollization, the argument, "but don't you see, we are all colonized, culture is colo11ial" can serve the flattelling of differellces about which Derrida himself rightly expresses concer11. But whell directed at the colonizer's ideIltity as sustaiI1ed by the belief that it is those others who lack identity, culture, la11guage, and land, not this colonizillg subject, Derrida's iIlterpretation has the greater potential. Hence the pertinellce of a rethinking of hospitality, the suggestion for "all unheard of cOllcept of hospitality " (1997a, 15) . For example, suggests Derrida iIl "Fidelite" one should first be "hospitable to the other within oneself ' (1999a, 139) . A failure to questiOl1 the integrity of one's own identity is seen in those self-righteous protestations that anyone living in Australia should be prepared to learn English, adopt certain stalldards, and ill immigration policy which determilles who shall, and shall not be allowed admittance. However, it is also seen ill belIevoleIlt extellsions of one's rights or lalld to those not legally elltitled to them as in the granting of asylum to the other-where what is wrong is not the asylum, but its COIlsolidation of the apparently rightful property of those offering it.
